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Summary
Computer controlled systems play important role aboard ships. Failure of such systems due 
to some component malfunction can be with fatal consequences. It is important to assess 
reliability and availability of such systems and minimum redundancy to ensure maintenance 
planning, ordering of spare components and safety of the voyage with as little as possible 
redundant components. This paper deals with development of model for reliability and 
availability of the computer system, which consists of three components with hot standby. 
Markov chains model is used to analyse probability of failure. Matrix of transitions is set after 
model development. Transition matrix is used to develop diff erential equations for model 
simulation. System’s reliability is larger if the system is under constant maintenance and service, 
but it would not be available. Hence, the optimum between reliability and availability should 
be found. System’s maintenance is limited during the voyage and hot standby is necessary to 
ensure success of the voyage. This paper presents a framework for assessment of reliability 
and availability of computer systems based on components’ redundancy, and practical data 
about MTBF. Many versions of the shipboard computer systems can be evaluated using the 
presented framework.
Sažetak
Računalno upravljani sustavi imaju značajnu ulogu na brodovima. Kvar tih sustava zbog 
neispravnosti neke od sastavnica može imati kobne posljedice. Važno je procijeniti pouzdanost 
i raspoloživost tih sustava te njihovu minimalnu redundantnost da bi se osiguralo planiranje 
održavanja, naručivanje rezervnih dijelova i sigurna plovidba, uz što manje redundantnih 
sastavnica. Ovaj rad bavi se razvojem modela pouzdanosti i raspoloživosti računalnog sustava, 
koji se sastoji od triju sastavnica sa standby opcijom. Model Markovljevih lanaca koristi se za 
analizu vjerojatnosti greške. Matrica prijelaza sastavljena je nakon razvijanja modela. Ona se 
koristi za razvoj diferencijalnih jednadžbi za simulaciju modela. Pouzdanost je sustava veća ako 
se on neprekidno održava i servisira, ali to ne bi bilo raspoloživo. Stoga bi trebalo naći najbolje 
rješenje između pouzdanosti i raspoloživosti. Održavanje sustava ograničeno je tijekom plovidbe, 
a standby neophodan je da bi se osiguralo njezino uspješno obavljanje. U radu predstavlja se okvir 
za procjenu pouzdanosti i raspoloživosti računalnih sustava koji se temelje na redundantnosti 
sastavnice te na praktičnim podacima o MTBF-u. S pomoću predstavljenog okvira može se ocijeniti 











1. INTRODUCTION / Uvod
Reliability and availability of all systems in transport and industry 
play an important role in choosing a product by a customer [1]. 
This directly infl uences a planned maintenance [2, 3]. Reliability and 
availability is of such importance that companies build databases 
to calculate i.e. MTTR, which is presented in [2]. Such collected data 
are used to detect faults [3] in ships’ systems. Computer systems are 
incorporated in systems of larger scale as control and/or monitoring 
parts/units. There are diff erences between computer systems in their 
construction by application needs, i.e. industrial computers are quite 
diff erent from PCs. In this paper, special computer is considered 
which consist of limited number of components.
An example of reliability and availability research is explained 
in [1], where authors model a quality control system, which is based 
on computers. However, infl uencing parameters are hardware, 
software, and environment. A core part of any computer system 
(hardware part) is microprocessor unit. All processor manufacturers 
invest in ensuring long processor lifetime by limiting failures [4]. 
Mechanisms for failures are researched world-wide. In [4] wear-out 
related hard errors are considered. The mechanisms of such failures 
lay in several phenomena, i.e. stress migration, electromigration or 
time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB). Processor long-term 
reliability is usually represented by the Bathtub Curve [5], which 
consists of three parts – early life, useful life and wear-out. Every part 
of the curve is characterized by diff erent failure mechanism. Since 
long-term processor reliability is almost completely dependent 
on intrinsic failures and wear-out, so-called reliability awareness 
microarchitectural design (RAMP) model is introduced in [6]. RAMP 
is interesting due to aggressive transistor scaling and increasing 
processor power, which leads to increase in temperature and 
demands more eff orts in thermal design of microprocessors. In 
order to incorporate other parts of computer in the analysis, a 
framework for architecture-level lifetime reliability modelling is 
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introduced in [7]. The research includes Monte Carlo simulations 
and eff ective combination of low-level eff ects and architectural-
level eff ects. Mechanisms for failure analysed are: electromigration, 
negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) and TDDB. The work 
includes other components of the system, such as SRAM (Static 
Random-Access Memory) and redundant systems.
Reliability of memory was addressed in [8-11]. Reliability of 
ferroelectric RAM was analysed in [8]. Design of fault-tolerant RAM 
was the scope of [9]. Optimization criteria were considered in [11]. 
Criteria were minimization of costs, maximization of equipment 
availability, and the achievement of a desired stock reliability. 
Normal distribution and Poisson process approach were used for 
non-repairable components.
Reliability and availability of an industrial computer system was 
presented in [1], which is similar to ship’s system due to the scope 
of such systems. The diff erence is in a fact that ship’s system should 
not fail between two harbours. So, the situations with double 
failure (main and redundant components) should be avoided.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
process of model development. In section 3, the results of simulation 
are presented and discussed. Section 4 is the conclusion section.
2. DEVELOPING SIMULATION MODEL FROM 
THEORY / Razvoj simulacijskog modela iz teorije
In order to determine system’s availability, it is necessary to develop 
simplifi ed model and exploit it. Availability is defi ned by [12]:
MTTR+MTBF
MTBF=Ai                                       (1)
where MTTR is Mean Time To Repair and MTBF Mean Time 
Before Failure. Availability is often expressed as:
                                             (2)
where λ is the intensity of failures and μ the intensity of repairs. 
Intensity of failures can be determined by [12, 13]:
                                            (3)
Intensity of repairs is defi ned with [12]:
                                             (4)
Simulation model considered deals only with hardware part 
of the computer system. In order to simplify the model, only 
three crucial components were taken into account. The research 
can be extended for more components if necessary for some 
specifi c purpose. Every component have hot standby in parallel 
branch. Considered components of the computer system are: 
microprocessor (MP), random access memory (RM) and hard disk 
(TD). Considered computer system can be shown by block-diagram 
in Figure 1. Redundant components are shown in parallel branches. 
Since, computer fails if any of parallel branches fails, three parallel 
branches are connected into series (see reliability in parallel [13]). 
There are several more components that could be taken account, 
but necessary data have not been available at time of research. 
Hence, this is a simplifi ed model.
Table 1 shows all possible states of the system. However, it is 
necessary to consider only situations which do not lead to system 
failure. Operational component is in state ”0” and the component is 
state of failure is in state “1”. For example, state 1 can be expressed 
as: &&MP2MP1 && RM2RM1 1& 2TD TD . If some component 
is in state of failure, then it is written with negation (i.e. TD2 ).
Figure 1 Considered system
Slika 1. Razmatrani sustav
All allowed cases (27 in total) can be reduced by diff erent 
formulation. Cases when one component in parallel is operational 
and one in failure state can be expressed as one new case when parallel 
are operational. For example, cases no 2 and 3 from Table 1 can be 
written as one case: 
_____ _____
1* 2* 1*RM2*( 1 2)MP MP RM TD TD .
Table 1 Possible states of the system (not double strikethrough)
Tablica 1. Moguća stanja sustava (ne dvaput precrtano)
No. MP1 MP2 RM1 RM2 TD1 TD2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 0 1 1
5 0 0 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 1 0 1
7 0 0 0 1 1 0
8 0 0 0 1 1 1
9 0 0 1 0 0 0
10 0 0 1 0 0 1
11 0 0 1 0 1 0
12 0 0 1 0 1 1
13 0 0 1 1 0 0
14 0 0 1 1 0 1
15 0 0 1 1 1 0
16 0 0 1 1 1 1
17 0 1 0 0 0 0
18 0 1 0 0 0 1
19 0 1 0 0 1 0
20 0 1 0 0 1 1
21 0 1 0 1 0 0
22 0 1 0 1 0 1
23 0 1 0 1 1 0
24 0 1 0 1 1 1
25 0 1 1 0 0 0
26 0 1 1 0 0 1
27 0 1 1 0 1 0
28 0 1 1 0 1 1
29 0 1 1 1 0 0
30 0 1 1 1 0 1
31 0 1 1 1 1 0
32 0 1 1 1 1 1
33 1 0 0 0 0 0
34 1 0 0 0 0 1
35 1 0 0 0 1 0
36 1 0 0 0 1 1
37 1 0 0 1 0 0
38 1 0 0 1 0 1
39 1 0 0 1 1 0
40 1 0 0 1 1 1
41 1 0 1 0 0 0
42 1 0 1 0 0 1
43 1 0 1 0 1 0
44 1 0 1 0 1 1
45 1 0 1 1 0 0
46 1 0 1 1 0 1
47 1 0 1 1 1 0
48 1 0 1 1 1 1
49 1 1 0 0 0 0
50 1 1 0 0 0 1
51 1 1 0 0 1 0
52 1 1 0 0 1 1
53 1 1 0 1 0 0
54 1 1 0 1 0 1
55 1 1 0 1 1 0
56 1 1 0 1 1 1
57 1 1 1 0 0 0
58 1 1 1 0 0 1
59 1 1 1 0 1 0
60 1 1 1 0 1 1
61 1 1 1 1 0 0
62 1 1 1 1 0 1
63 1 1 1 1 1 0
64 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Therefore, 27 states can be reduced to just 9 states with 7 
transitions. State S0 is defi ned as the state with all components 
operational. If one component in parallel fails, transition from 
S0 to S1 (for MP failure), S2 (for RM failure) or S3 occurs (for TD 
failure). System cannot return from states S1, S2 and S3 to S0, 
because there are no repairs intensities. If the system is not 
maintained (repaired), the performance can be even worse. 
From S1, system can degrade to S4 or S5 or in total failure SK 
(state of failure). From S2, system can change its condition to 
states S4, S6 or SK. From S3, system can deteriorate to S5, S6 or 
SK. From new states, S4, S5 or S6, system can degrade to S7 or 
SK, and, fi nally, from S7 only to SK. Table 2 shows reduced states.
Table 2 Reduced system states
Tablica 2. Reducirana stanja sustava
State State’s description
S0 TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 &&&&&
S1   TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 &&&&|
S2   TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 &&|&&
S3  TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 |&&&&
S4     TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 &&|&|
S5    TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 |&&&|
S6    TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 |&|&&
S7      TD2TD1RM2RM1MP2MP1 |&|&|
Previous description can be shown in graphical 
representation as Markov model [14] of system reliability, as 
in Figure 2. Probabilities of state’s transition is calculated by 
introducing failure intensity, λ, and time interval, Δt. State of 
system failure, SK, occurs where serial connection is interrupted 
in any part of chain.
Figure 2 Graphical representation of the Markov model for 
system reliability
Slika 2. Grafi čki prikaz Markovljeva modela pouzdanosti sustava
When considering availability of the system, the system can 
return to previous state. Therefore, one can say that there is a 
relationship between previous states and new states through 
intensity of repairs. However, if the system reached the state of 
failure, it cannot return to the previous state. In order to simulate 
the system, it is important to get the system’s equations. Table 
3 shows probabilities of stats’ transitions for system’s reliability 
analysis.
Table 3 Transition of states for system’s reliability
Tablica 3. Prijelaz stanja za pouzdanost sustava
PS (t)
PS (t + Δt)












0 0 0 0 0 0
PS3 2λ3 0 0
1-(2λ1+ 
2λ2+λ3) 
0 0 0 0 0
PS4 0 2λ2 2λ1 0
1-(λ1+ 
λ2+2λ3) 
0 0 0 0








PS7 0 0 0 0 2λ3 2λ2 2λ1 1-(λ1+ λ2+λ3) 0
PSK 0 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ1+λ2 λ1+λ3 λ2+λ3 λ1+λ2+λ3 1
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From Table 3, it is possible to write system’s states as (5) - (13):
                                                                                       (5)
                                                              (6)
                                                             (7)
                                                             (8)
                                               (9)
                                               (10)
                                                 (11)
                                   (12)
                                      (13)
And, after including time-continuity in the equations, the system’s states can be transformed to (14) - (22):
                                                                                       (14)
                                                                         (15)
                                                                        (16)
                                                                        (17)
                                                          (18)
                                                         (19)
                                                         (20)
                                            (21)
                                      (22)
These equations can be used in simulation model for digital computers (i.e. in Simulink™). By analogy, Table 4 shows transitions of 
states in system’s availability and Figure 3 model of system’s availability. From Table 4, it is possible to write system’s states as (23) - (31):
                           (23)
                   (24)
                  (25)
                    (26)
                        (27)
                                       (28)
                                      (29)
                                 (30)
                              (31)
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Table 4 State’s transitions for system’s availability
Tablica 4. Prijelazi stanja za raspoloživost sustava
PS (t)
PS (t + Δt)
PS0 PS1 PS2 PS3 PS4 PS5 PS6 PS7 PSK
PS0 1-2(λ1+ λ2+λ3) μ1 μ2 μ3 0 0 0 0 0
PS1 2λ1 1-(λ1+ 2λ2+2λ3) - μ1 0 0 μ2 μ3 0 0 0
PS2 2λ2 0 1-(2λ1+ λ2+2λ3) - μ2 0 μ1 0 μ3 0 0
PS3 2λ3 0 0
1-(2λ1+ 
2λ2+λ3) - μ3
0 μ1 μ2 0 0
PS4 0 2λ2 2λ1 0
1-(λ1+ λ2+2λ3) 
- (μ1+ μ2)
0 0 μ3 0
PS5 0 2λ3 0 2λ1 0
1-(λ1+ 2λ2+λ3) - 
(μ1+ μ3)
0 μ2 0




PS7 0 0 0 0 2λ3 2λ2 2λ1
1-(λ1+λ2+ λ3) - 
(μ1 +μ2+μ3)
0
PSK 0 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ1+λ2 λ1+λ3 λ2+λ3 λ1+λ2+λ3 1
Figure 3 System’s availability
Slika 3. Raspoloživost sustava
After including time-continuity in the equation, we obtain (32)-(40):
                                             (32)
                                    (33)
                                    (34)
                                   (35)
                               (36)
                             (37)
                             (38)
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These equations were used in building the actual simulation 
model in Simulink™.
3. RESULTS / Rezultati
3.1. Setup / Plan rada
Firstly, reliability of the considered system is simulated. In the 
fi rst step, simulation model is used to analyse probability of 
staying in initial non-failure state, 0S . Simulation is performed 
with the assumption that parameters λ are constant for the 
analysed system. Several service intervals were simulated, from 
likely to non-likely. The value of parameter μ is set to diff erent 
service intervals.
Confi guration of the modelled computer system consists 
of: microprocessor Intel Core 2 Quad, Kingston RAM 4GB DDR3 
1600MHz, and hard disk Western Digital Velociraptor 1TB. 
Values of the MTBF are taken from web resources [15 - 17]. 
Microprocessor’s MTBF is equal to 73803 hours (3.37 years), 
RAM’s MTBF is equal to 6618133.7 hours (302.2 years) and HDD’s 
MTBF is equal to 1400000 hours (63.93 years).
3.2. Simulation results / Rezultati simulacije
Figure 4 shows that probability of staying in initial state is 50% 
after one year. Furthermore, probability of changing the state is 
90% in three year period.
Figure 4 Probability of non-failure state without service and in 
regular service intervals from 0.25 to 8 years in simulation of 
reliability
Slika 4. Vjerojatnost stanja bez greške bez servisiranja i tijekom 
servisiranja u redovitim razmacima od 0,25 do 8 godina pri 
simuliranju pouzdanosti
Figure 5 shows probability of changing state into failure 
state, Pk, obtained in simulation of reliability. Simulation of 
availability implies that probability of staying in the initial state 
is 50% in 1.7 years interval for service intensity of 0.5, 3 years for 
1-year service interval and 7.5 years for 2 services per year.
Figure 5 Probability of failure state without service and in regular 
service intervals from 0.25 to 8 years in simulation of reliability
Slika 5. Vjerojatnost stanja greške bez servisiranja i tijekom 
servisiranja u redovitim razmacima od 0,25 do 8 godina pri 
simuliranju pouzdanosti
The probability that the system will not stay in the initial 
state is equal to 90% for availability simulation and time period 
depends on repair’s intensity. If repair’s intensity is 0.5, then 
the 90% is obtained after 12 years. For repair’s intensity 1, 90% 
probability is obtained after 19 years. 33 years is the time to get 
to 90% probability in intensity of repairs of factor 2.
In the second step, the developed simulation model is used 
to analyse probability of failure state. Figure 6 shows probability 
of staying in the initial state for availability simulation. Legend 
data (years) denoted service intervals.
Figure 6 Probability of staying in the initial state for availability 
simulation in dependence to service intervals
Slika 6. Vjerojatnost ostajanja u početnom stanju pri simuliranju 
raspoloživosti ovisno o razmacima servisiranja
                         (39)
                                      (40)
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Figure 7 Probability of failure state in availability simulation 
Slika 7. Vjerojatnost stanja greške pri simuliranju raspoloživosti
Time dependence of transition to state of failure is shown in 
Figure 7. Legend data (years) denoted service intervals. It can be 
seen that probability of failure state (in case of reliability) is about 
50% after 4 years, 50% after 4 years, and 90% after 10 years. In case 
of availability, 50% probability of failure is after 6 years with repair’s 
intensity of 0.5, 8 years with repair’s intensity of 1, and 11.5 years for 
repair’s intensity of factor 2.
Probability of failure state is 90% after 17 years with intensity of 
repairs 0.5, 24 years for repair’s intensity of factor 1, and 37.4 years 
for repair’s intensity of factor 2 (service - 2 times per year).
Table 5 shows results for total reliabilities/availabilities for all 
states when system is operational in cases of 0.5, 1, and 2 years 
service intervals after 1, 3, and 5 years of operation. 
4. CONCLUSION / Zaključak
Many published research works are concerned about physical 
phenomena behind system failure. We used a diff erent approach: 
known MTBF data for known components are used to predict 
reliability and availability of the computer system without 
introducing physical layer of failure mechanisms. The motive is 
in companies, which are not interested in physical phenomena 
research but in knowing how safe their fl eet is.
It is shown that computer with one redundancy per component 
can be operational without repairs for 1 year with 50% probability.
If we maintain the system and repair it, the system will have longer 
life expectancy. For more repairs system life is longer. But, if we repair 
the system all the time, we won’t be able to work on it. Therefore, there 
is no economic value of all-time-repaired systems. Therefore, optimum 
between system’s availability and repair’s rate should be found.
An interesting implication is the choice of components used 
for the simulation. We used “normal” PC components. It would 
be interesting to compare these data to the corresponding 
components in the aboard computer systems.
Nowadays trends are to include as much as possible PC 
computers aboard ships, but it is still limited trend. The most 
computer-controlled systems use PLCs (Programmable Logic 
Controller). 
Measures to increase reliability of ships’ computer systems have 
economic costs. For example, increase in redundancy means better 
reliability, but also new computers in standby. However, distributed 
networks can reduce such cost and increase reliability. Hence, old 
ships should be modernized, if possible, to increase redundancy by 
integrated ship’s networks.
Similar approach as in this paper can be used if more 
components are taken into account. In such case, we just add more 
parallel branches in series. 
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Table 5 Total reliabilities/availabilities for all states when system is operational















1 1 0.991 0.989 2 0.9695 0.9886 0.5 0.9969 0.9972
3 1 0.945 0.9213 2 0.9 0.9213 0.5 0.98 0.9773
5 1 0.9134 0.8294 2 0.8742 0.8295 0.5 0.9586 0.9427
